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NOTES
SECONDARY PICKETING IN RAILWAY LABOR DISPUTES: A
RIGHT PRESERVED UNDER THE NORRIS-
LAGUARDIA ACT
INTRODUCTION
The spring of 1986 found the members of the Brotherhood of Mainte-
nance of Way Employees (BMWE) engaged in a lawful' strike against
the Maine Central Railroad and the Portland Terminal Company (Maine
Central), subsidiaries of Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc.' The
railroads continued to operate in the face of the strike, however, in part
because they used striker replacement crews and management substi-
tutes,3 and in part because other railroads carried much of the Guilford
lines' traffic under interchange agreements.4
To increase pressure upon Maine Central, BMWE asked members em-
ployed by railroads interchanging traffic with Guilford lines to picket
their respective employers.' The Union hoped that these "secondary"
pickets6 would drive the secondary employers to pressure Maine Central
1. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1982), requires that all railway
labor disputes undergo the Act's dispute resolution procedures if they "gro[w] out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions," id., at § 153(i), or involve "the meaning or the appli-
cation of any agreement" arrived at using the Act's procedures. Id. at § 155.
By judicial implication, exhaustion of the Act's procedures permit the parties to resort
to self-help, making ensuing strikes by employees "lawful." Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1969); Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 244 (1966); Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 291 (1963).
2. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1229 (1st Cir. 1986). The Portland Terminal Company is a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of the Maine Central Railroad. Id. Maine Central, along with the Boston & Maine
and Delaware & Hudson Railroads are subsidiaries of Guilford Transportation Indus-
tries, Inc. Id. The BMWE initially struck only Maine Central and Portland Terminal
Company. Id. It extended its strike to Boston & Maine, with which Maine Central inter-
connects, and then to Delaware & Hudson. Id.
3. Id.
4. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 797
(7th Cir.), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). - '[I]nterchange' refers to the practice of
accepting freight cars from, or delivering freight cars to, another railroad so that shippers
can move freight over a number of different railroads to their ultimate destination." Per-
ritt, Am I My Brother's Keeper? Secondary Picketing Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 68
Geo. L.J. 1191, 1193 n.15 (1980) (quoting Alton & S. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry.. Airline
& S.S. Clerks, 99 L.R.R.M. 2323, 2323 (D.D.C.), aff'd without opinion, 99 L.R.R.M.
3326 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996 (1978)).
5. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.. 793 F.2d 795. 797
(7th Cir.) cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
6. C. Gregory & H. Katz, Labor and the Law (3d ed. 1979) supplies the following
definition of a secondary boycott:
A secondary labor boycott occurs when a group of employee, refuse to remain
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to concede to union demands.7 The union members complied and the
Union achieved its first goal: BMWE members and other employees of
the interchanging railroads, though they had no complaint with their
own working conditions, refused to cross the picket lines, thus shutting
down much of the secondary employers' operations.8 The secondary em-
ployers frustrated BMWE's second goal, however, when they bypassed
Guilford Transportation and turned instead to the courts for the more
immediate and certain relief offered by an injunction.9 The six besieged
interchange railroads brought separate actions against BMWE in federal
district courts across five circuits. 10
The resulting decisions display vast confusion as to whether federal
courts have jurisdiction to issue injunctions against secondary picketing
in railway disputes. The district courts split on the issue: though all held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' 1 if applicable, denies federal courts ju-
at work for an employer, not because of any complaint over their labor stan-
dards under him but because he persists in dealing with a third person against
whom they have some grievance. Their pressure is exerted against him in the
hope of forcing him to cease dealing with the third person in question .... As
such, it is an attempt to secure the economic assistance of their employer to
compel this third person to capitulate to the union over some issue between
them, at the risk of losing the unionized employer's business if he does not
capitulate.
Id. at 120-21.
7. See supra note 5.
8. For summaries of the district court opinions, see Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986), petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry.,
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In
some instances, the secondary employer, notified in advance by BMWE of its intention to
set up pickets, secured injunctions preventing the establishment of the pickets. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d
Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
Other cases make no statement about the extent of the damage suffered by the secondary
employer. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus.,
803 F.2d 1228, 1229 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165
(U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175). In all instances, however, BMWE intended the secon-
dary picketing to shut down the secondary employer. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60
(1986).
9. Burlington, 793 F.2d at 797.
10. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795
F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986)
(No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.. 795 F.2d
1161 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No.
86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d
795 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1986). petition Jbr cert. fled. 55
U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2. 1986) (No. 86-353).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982 & Supp. IIl 1985). For the text ofthe relevant section,,
of the Act and additional discussion, see hifra notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
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risdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes,' injunctions issued in
three of the six cases. 1
3
Half the trial courts held outright that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
barred issuance of an injunction.' 4 Two courts found that although the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's broad prohibition against federal injunctive re-
lief in labor disputes normally would bar the relief sought, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act must bow to the more specific underlying goals and pro-
cedures of the Railway Labor Act.' 5 Most railway labor disputes are
subject exclusively to the constraints of the Railway Labor Act,' 6 but the
Act stands silent as to the availability of secondary picketing as a weapon
in the laborer's self-help arsenal. This silence further fuels the confu-
sion.' 7 Two courts raised a similar "accommodation" argument with re-
gard to the Interstate Commerce Act.18
12. For summaries of the district court findings, see Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1230 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), peti-
tion for cerL filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. &
P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986),
petition for cerL filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Ver-
mont Ry., Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 798
(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of
Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55
U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
For an explanation of the courts' views on limitations of the applicability of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, see infra notes 127-79 and accompanying text.
13. For summaries of the district court holdings, see Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60
(1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303,
304 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-
353).
14. For the district court holdings in these cases, see Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1230 (1st Cir. 1986); Richmond, F. &
P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Ver-
mont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
15. For the district court findings, as summarized by the courts of appeals, see Bur-
lington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303
(U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353) [hereinafter Conrail].
The Conrail district court added a novel twist to its Railway Labor Act accommoda-
tion argument: it held that the secondary picketing issue must be subjected to Railway
Labor Act procedures and therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act must give way. Id. See
infra notes 192 and 194-208.
16. See supra note 1.
17. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1229 (Ist Cir. 1986); Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d
1357, 1370 & n.25 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 391 (1969)).
18. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
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Two other trial courts held that the secondary pickets involved in
these cases exceeded the activities protected by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.'9 They reasoned that the absence of "substantial alignment" be-
tween Maine Central and the secondary employers constituted an excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition on injunctive relief.20
They based their conclusions on the economic self-interest/substantial
alignment test as developed by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth2 and
Eighth Circuits22 in two earlier decisions. Those courts, envisioning a
1228, 1234-35 (Ist Cir. 1986) (for district court opinion as reported by 1st Circuit); Bur-
lington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 800 (7th Cir.)
(for district court opinion as reported by 7th Circuit), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
See infra notes 178 and 210-13 and accompanying text.
19. For summaries of the district court findings, see Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60
(1986); see also Perritt, supra note 4, at 1228.
20. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170
(4th Cir. 1986) (district court "conclud[ed] that there was no substantial alignment be-
tween [Norfolk & Western and Maine Central] or the Guilford Rail System and no labor
dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act") (brackets not in original),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Burlington
N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.) (district
court held in part that the Norris-LaGuardia Act required that the secondary employer
have aligned himself substantially with the primary employer in order for the picketing to
"'gro[w] out of' a labor dispute," but that in the instant case, the railroad lacked suffi-
cient ties to the primary employer), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); see also Perritt,
supra note 4, at 1228.
21. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649
(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
22. Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980).
It should be noted that, although purporting to apply the same test, the Fifth and
Eighth circuits differ on exactly what constitutes the economic self-interest/substantial
alignment exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, further confusing the issue.
In creating the test, the Fifth Circuit required an economic self-interest in the picketing
on the part of the union as manifested by either substantial alignment between the secon-
dary and primary employers or by an economic interest in the strike's outcome on the
part of the secondary employees themselves. In the current interchange cases, the secon-
dary employees have an interest in maintaining uniform wages, hours, and working con-
ditions. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649,
654-55 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966). The Eighth Circuit
acknowledged only a portion of the test: economic self-interest as manifested by substan-
tial alignment between the primary and secondary employers. See Ashley, Drew & N.
Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1364 (8th Cir. 1980).
Furthermore, the district court in Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 793 F.2d 795 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986), totally misapplied the
test by defining substantial alignment as the percentage of the secondary employer's busi-
ness made up of transactions with the primary employer. Id. at 799. For example, it
found that "'over the course of a year [Burlington] carries only 1,400 cars received from
or bound to a Guilford line. This is 0.043% of the Burlington's traffic .... This is too
little.., to be a 'substantial alignment' of the secondary employer with the primary ......
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need to protect neutral parties from secondary picketing,2-' held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act protected secondary pickets only where the sec-
ondary picketing furthered the union's economic interest in the strike's
outcome 4 as a result of the secondary employer's substantial alignment
with the primary employer. Prior to the Maine Central dispute, the basi-
23. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th
Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub noin. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966), the legal primary strike involved the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and Florida East Coast Railroad [hereinafter FEC],
which owned one-quarter of the Jacksonville Terminal Company, the secondary em-
ployer. Id. at 650. Separate management ran the Terminal Company, and its employees
who belonged to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, operated under a collective bar-
gaining agreement independent of the one under which FEC employees worked. Id. at
651.
Jacksonville had contracted with FEC to provide interchange services constituting one-
third of all interchanges performed at the Terminal Company, as well as track mainte-
nance, minor equipment repairs, signal and switching services, and "car service," as de-
fined by 49 U.S.C. § 10102(3) (1982). Id. at 650. When FEC's Brotherhood members
threatened to strike FEC and to picket the Terminal Company, Terminal Company em-
ployees warned that they would not cross the picket lines. Id. at 651. FEC immediately
sought and received an injunction ordering Terminal Company to perform its contractual
obligations owed to FEC. Id. FEC employees carried out their threat to picket the Ter-
minal Company and succeeded in keeping hundreds of Terminal Company employees
from reporting to work. Id. In response, the Terminal Company filed for injunctive re-
lief, in part, to comply with the injunction obtained by FEC and, in part, presumably to
carry out its other business that included mail, passenger, and freight transit. Id.
The district court enjoined the picketing, finding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
inapplicable and presumably finding that the picketing constituted illegal interference
with the Terminal Company's obligations under the FEC's injunction, the Interstate
Commerce Act, and its contractual obligations to other customers. Id. at 652. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
applied facially, id. at 653, but that the facts of the situation warranted injunctive protec-
tion of the picketing because it addressed the economic self-interest of both the union and
the secondary employees. Id. at 654. The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided
court. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
Although no injunction issued under these facts, the court foresaw the possibility of
picketing against secondary employers lacking substantial ties to the primary employer,
and took the opportunity to provide for a judicially created limitation on the Act's prohi-
bition on injunctive relief against secondary picketing. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 654-55 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385
U.S. 20 (1966). This limitation took the form of the economic self-interest/substantial
alignment exception. Id. See infra notes 173-91 and 202-09 and accompanying text.
For the facts giving rise to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Ashley, Drew and N. Ry. v.
United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980), see infra notes 218-24 and accom-
panying text.
24. According to the Fifth Circuit, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, involved
in a labor dispute with FEC, possessed an economic self-interest in picketing a secondary
employer substantially aligned with the FEC because the secondary employer could affect
positively the outcome of the labor dispute. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlan-
tic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'dper curiain by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
The maintenance of wage, hour, and working condition standards constituted an interest
on the part of the secondary employees as well. Id. at 655. The test, however, does not
require this second prong of self-interest. See id. at 654-55. See also Perritt, supra note 4,
at 1228.
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cally consistent decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits were the only
appellate level cases on the issue."
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits broadened the controversy by denying in-
junctive relief in each of the Guilford strike appeals.2 6 For the most part,
the courts ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's broad language consti-
tuted an absolute bar on the federal courts' power to enjoin secondary
picketing. These six decisions directly conflicted with the precedent
established by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. The Circuit courts also
divided over whether, and to what extent, the Railway Labor Act and
the Interstate Commerce Act affect the applicability of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.28
Thus, the question presented by these cases and discussed in this Note
is whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act denies federal courts jurisdiction to
enjoin secondary picketing by participants in railway labor disputes.29
25. The district courts often mixed these arguments in different combinations to sup-
port their ultimate findings. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165
(U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 798-99 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
26. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empis. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1230 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empis.,
795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug.
1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
795 F.2d 1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S, Sept.
26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
27. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228,
1230 (1st Cir. 1986); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
795 F.2d 1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept.
26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empis.,
793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 804 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
28. Individual courts themselves sometimes split on the proper outcome, resulting in
dissenting opinions. See Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 795 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
29. The disputes in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362
F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966), Ashley, Drew and N.
Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980), and the recent in-
terchange cases, see supra note 10, represent most, but not all, of the recent cases involv-
ing secondary railway picketing. A strike in 1978 produced another rash of cases that are
not discussed in this Note because they add nothing new, raise different issues, and with
one exception, never proceeded beyond the district court level. For a discussion of these
cases, see Perritt, supra note 4, at 1193-94 & nn.15-19.
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The answer to this question is yes. Although a sense of fairness"0 might
argue for the availability of injunctive relief where secondary pickets ef-
fectively shut down the secondary employer's railyard, the plain lan-
guage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act- in conjunction with its legislative
history,3 2 the judicial interpretations which have followed,"3 and the lan-
guage and purpose of the Railway Labor Act,34 mandate the opposite
result.
Part I of this Note examines the plain meaning of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. It concludes that the Act's broad, unambiguous language for-
bids federal courts to issue injunctions against secondary activity
initiated in response to labor disputes. Part II analyzes the Act's legisla-
tive history and finds that Congress intended the Act to prohibit injunc-
tive relief against secondary as well as primary activity involving or
arising out of labor disputes, including railway labor disputes. Part III
considers and rejects arguments that the Norris-LaGuardia Act must ac-
commodate the Railway Labor Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, or
both, in cases involving railway labor disputes. Section V examines pol-
icy reasons for and against allowing secondary picketing in railway dis-
putes. This Note concludes that no jurisdiction exists for federal court
issuance of injunctions against secondary railway pickets.
I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
Whenever the interpretation of a statute plays a part in a law suit, the
rules of statutory construction require that the court first look to the
language of the statute.35 If its wording is unequivocal, then its meaning
is plain and the courts must apply the law as such without any further
inquiry.36 The applicable sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act plainly
prohibit injunctions against both primary and secondary pickets arising
out of labor disputes.37 Therefore, federal courts lack jurisdiction to
grant the injunctive relief sought by the interchange employers.
Two sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act govern the issue raised by
the interchange pickets: sections 10438 and 113. 39 Section 104(e) prohib-
30. See infra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 64-189 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 1, 167-72, 192, and 194-208 and accompanying text.
35. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); United States v.
Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); 2A
N. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 73 (4th ed. 1984).
36. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); United States v. Pennsylvania Envtl. Hearing
Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1281 n.26 (3d Cir. 1978); N. Singer, supra note 35, § 46.04, at 86.
37. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982) states in relevant part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
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its federal courts from granting injunctive relief in cases "involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute ... from ... [g]iving publicity to
the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute ... by adver-
tising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud
or violence."4 Section 113 defines a case which grows out of or involves
a labor dispute as one which:
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or
occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein ... or who are
members of the same or an affiliated organizaton of... employees ....
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment ... regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.4 '
Application of this broad, unambiguous language to the facts of the
interchange cases brings them within the purview of the statute. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act protects the union's peaceful picketing, regardless
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or inter-
ested in such dispute... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence....
Id.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1982) in relevant part reads:
When used in this chapter, and for the purposes of this chapter -
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when
the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or
occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of
the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organiza-
tion of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or
more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or
associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or associations of
employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) be-
tween one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more
employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflict-
ing or competing interests in a "labor dispute" (as defined in this section) of
"persons participating or interested" therein (as defined in this section).
(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or
interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is
engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute
occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or
agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employ-
ees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 38 for the full text of
§ 104(e).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 113(a), (c) (1982).
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of the lack of privity between the secondary employers and primary em-
ployees.42 BMWE secondary picketing qualifies as a labor dispute under
several definitions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act: it involves
"persons who are engaged in the same industry;"4 3 parties who are both
"members of the same or an affiliated organization of... employees;"
and parties who are directly or indirectly interested in the outcome of the
dispute "between one or more employers ... and one or more ... as-
sociations of employees."'45
The BMWE cases all involve railway employers and employees.46
Some of the secondary employees belong to the same union as the pri-
mary employees on whose behalf they are striking.4 This relationship
gives them an interest in maintaining uniform employment standards and
thus an interest in the outcome of the dispute.48 In addition, the motiva-
tion for the secondary picketing "concern[s] terms or conditions of em-
ployment."49 Maine Central's collective bargaining agreement with
BMWE expired in 1984.50 Unable to agree on wages, the parties submit-
ted their pay dispute to Railway Labor Act procedures, and BMVE
42. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1982).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1229 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug.
1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
795 F.2d 1161, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S.
Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d
Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
These cases all arise from the same underlying dispute and so share the same basic fact
pattern: railroad employees stage an unsuccessful strike against their primary employer,
then extend it to other railroads or yards that interchange with the primary employer.
47. In at least one of the cases discussed in this Note, the striking primary employees
actually picketed the secondary employer themselves. See Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 650-51 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Train-
men, 385 U.S. 20 (1966). In others, the union asked members from another local to erect
the pickets. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d
795, 797 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). In either event, the union intended
the secondary picketing to deter the secondary employees-union and non-union mem-
bers alike-from reporting for work. Eg., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20
(1966).
48. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649,
655 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub non. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
50. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
796 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
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members continued to work under the old agreement pending Railway
Labor Act exhaustion.5' When the Railway Labor Act procedures failed
to resolve the dispute, the BMWE went on strike.52 Thus, the parties'
inability to agree on contract terms falls squarely within the statute's def-
inition of a labor dispute.53
Further, the Norris-LaGuardia Act contains no exceptions for secon-
dary pickets or any other labor tactic.54 The language is broad and taken
as a whole indicates that the prohibition is equally broad." To insure
broad application, Congress included a "purpose" clause for use by
courts as a guide to construction.56 This purpose clause communicates
Congress' concern with abusive employment practices, the role of judi-
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See supra notes 38-39.
54. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1370 n.25
(8th Cir. 1980) (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 391 (1969)); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Sections 104(f) and 104(i) limit the Act's protections to acts not involving fraud or
violence. See 29 U.S.C. § 104(f), (i) (1982).
55. Another rule of statutory construction allows courts to read the sections as an
integrated document. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); NLRB v.
Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 345 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1953); Juvenile Prods. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Edmisten, 568 F. Supp.
714, 718 (E.D.N.C. 1983); N. Singer, supra note 35, § 46.05, at 90. Any one section may
be interpreted to make it consistent with the statute's entirety. Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957); Juvenile Prods.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Edmisten, 568 F. Supp. 714, 718 (E.D.N.C. 1983); N. Singer, supra note
35, § 46.05, at 90-92. Some courts in reading the Norris-LaGuardia Act have concluded
that the integrated whole does not support secondary activity. See Ashley, Drew & N.
Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 657 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J.,
dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) states:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority
are defined and limited in this chapter, the public policy of the United States is
declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his free-
dom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employ-
ment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion; therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.
Id. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., Ist
Sess. 11 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4503 (1932).
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cial activists in the growth of these abusive practices, and its belief that
the unfettered organization of labor could eliminate such employment
abuses.57 The purpose clause instructs courts to construe the newly im-
posed limitation on injunctive power in labor disputes with these pur-
poses firmly in mind.58
Accordingly, on numerous occasions the Supreme Court has held that
the Act stands as a clear and broad bar against federal judicial interfer-
ence in labor disputes. 59 For example, in Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 6" the Court held that manage-
ment's refusal to arbitrate changes to a collective bargaining agreement
constituted a labor dispute for Norris-LaGuardia Act purposes.61 The
Court stated that the broad language of the Act, reinforced by its pur-
pose clause, allowed for only one possible result: classification of the
facts in issue as a labor dispute for Norris-LaGuardia Act purposes.62
Thus, the plain meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits fed-
eral courts from enjoining secondary pickets erected in a railway dispute.
Despite the clear language of the Act and Supreme Court rulings uphold-
ing this conclusion, courts have gone beyond the "four comers" of the
Act to determine its scope.63
57. In presenting the bill to the Senate for debate, Senator Blaine said by way of
introduction of section 2:
[T]he declaration of public policy section [102] .... presents, at the same time,
a rule of interpretation and a statement of the underlying thought of Congress
.... of the necessity for labor organizations and the right of workingmen to
freely associate and to be represented in negotiations concerning the terms and
conditions of employment by representatives of their own choice.
75 Cong. Rec. 4626 (1932).
58. See supra notes 56-57.
59. See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 711-12 (1982) (a political secondary boycott arising out of the Soviet
Union's invasion of Afghanistan held within Act's purview); Marine Cooks & Stewards v.
Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369-72 (1960) (a picket by non-employees of a Liberian
ship that hired non-union help at substandard wages subject to Act's controls); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941) (holding Norris-LaGuardia jurisdic-
tional limitations applied to a criminal action alleging Sherman Act antitrust violations
arising from pickets established in violation of an arbitration agreement).
60. 362 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1960).
61. Id. at 331-35.
62. The Court's language leaves no room for doubt regarding its position on inter-
preting the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
Unless the literal language of this definition [section 113(e)] is to be ignored, it
squarely covers this controversy. Congress made the definition broad because it
wanted it to be broad.... Section 2 of this Act specifies the public policy to be
taken into consideration in interpreting the Act's language and in determining
the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts; it is one of freedom of associa-
tion, organization, representation and negotiation on the part of workers.
Id. at 335-36 (footnote omitted) (brackets not in original).
63. See, e.g., Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357,
1362-63 (8th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362
F.2d 649, 653-54 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiaim by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlan-
tic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
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II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A finding by a court that the statute is not clear on its face, 64 or that
adherence to the plain meaning would lead to either absurd results 65 or
the frustration of congressional purpose66 frees a court from the con-
straints of the plain meaning rule. During the last twenty years, some
courts addressing the issue of Norris-LaGuardia Act applicability to sec-
ondary picketing in railway labor disputes have found the language to be
vague,67 absurd,68 or at odds with congressional intent,69 and have come
64. See United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Ex parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899).
65. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 342 (1950) (quoting Edelstein v. United
States, 149 F. 636, 643-44, (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205 U.S. 543 (1907)); United
States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931);
Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365 (8th Cir.
1980).
66. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964) (quoting Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); United States v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 683
(1950).
67. Although none of the interchange decisions expressly pronounced the Norris-La-
Guardia Act vague, some did so implicitly. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood
of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986) (district court held that
since secondary employer not substantially aligned with primary employer, Norris-La-
Guardia did not adhere), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986)
(No. 86-175); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
799 (7th Cir.) (district court held that no substantial alignment existed and that Railway
Labor Act and Interstate Commerce Act requirements took priority over Norris-La-
Guardia Act), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir.) (although statutory language appears
clear, court implies an exception), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub norn.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
68. Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365-66
(8th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d
649, 658 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
69. Though not stated explicitly, some of these courts found the Norris-LaGuardia
Act vague or to lead to results which were absurd or in conflict with congressional intent.
For example, adherence to the substantial alignment exception presumes a limitation un-
stated in the Act's text but which the courts have held to comport with congressional
intent or to be necessary to avoid absurd results achieved by literal application of the
statutory language. See, e.g., Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625
F.2d 1357, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1980) (court went beyond facial applicability of the statu-
tory language to interpret it in the light of its history); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 658 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting) (court
found facts fell within the statute's literal language but proceeded to create an exception),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Broth-
erhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
Similarly, the courts ruling that the general purposes of the Railway Labor Act re-
quired the Norris-LaGuardia Act to give way to it also implicitly concluded that any
other finding would contravene congressional intent by yielding an absurd result.
Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act contains no Railway Labor Act exemption, these
courts have interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia Act as implicitly excepting the Railway
Labor Act from its coverage. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 796 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit reversed district court's issu-
ance of injunction, finding that failure to do so would result in interference with the
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up with a number of alternatives. 0
Some of these courts found that Congress did not intend the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to cover secondary pickets."' One dissenting judge as-
serted that Congress intended to exclude railway labor cases from Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act protection. 2 Still other courts developed a third,
hybrid argument: if the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to disputes cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act, it must yield to the superior aims of the
more specific Railway Labor Act.73 A few courts found a need to accom-
modate the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the purposes underlying the Inter-
railroad's Interstate Commerce Act duties and would undermine the Railway Labor
Act), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of
Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (Second Circuit reversed district
court holding that Railway Labor Act procedures must be exhausted prior to invocation
of Norris-LaGuardia protections), petition for cert filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2,
1986) (No. 86-353).
These same absurdity or contrary-to-congressional-intent arguments arise in reference
to Interstate Commerce Act exemption arguments as well. See supra note 18 and infra
notes 209-14.
70. See supra notes 17-27.
71. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1366-67
(8th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d
649, 657-59 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20
(1966).
In a variation of the above argument, some courts have interpreted the Act as inappli-
cable to secondary picketing of neutral third parties. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986) (Fourth Circuit
reversed district court holding that "no labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act... which would justify the union's secondary picketing"), petition for
cerL filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Burlington N.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit
reversed district court finding that Norris-LaGuardia Act adhered to secondary picketing
only when the secondary employer had aligned himself substantially with the primary
employer), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United
Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1364 (8th Cir. 1980) (court ruled that Norris-LaGuardia
provisions apply to a secondary employer only when it substantially aligns itself with the
primary employer); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362
F.2d 649, 654-55 (5th Cir.) (Norris-LaGuardia provisions apply to a secondary employer
who has aligned himself substantially with the primary employer), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Train-
men, 385 U.S. 20 (1966). See generally infra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
Another related argument involves a reading that Congress intended to require privity
between the parties, thus entirely removing secondary activity from the realm of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
The railroads, in support of their petitions for injunctive relief from secondary picket-
ing, often have argued that the Act's prohibitions do not apply to neutral third parties.
See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d
1161, 1163 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986)
(No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d
1298, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1986): Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 805-07 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
72. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 362 F.2d 649,
659 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub
noin. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
73. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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state Commerce Act,74 which aspires to maintain the free and continuous
flow of goods in interstate traffic.75
Part II discusses the first of these contentions76 -that Congress did
not intend for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to cover secondary pickets-in
light of legislative history and the arguments presented by courts on each
side of the issue.
A. Historical Background to the Passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Much of America's labor law developed rapidly, stimulated by its in-
dustrial revolution. 77 Congress often targeted legislation to address a par-
ticular problem without necessarily giving much thought to how
individual laws interacted, or failed to interact, with each other.78 In
addition, some laws have remained on the books unamended although
they appear to conflict with others 79 or to have outlived their useful-
ness. s° The piecemeal evolution of labor legislation sometimes has led to
what are, or might appear to be, anomalous results.8 '
The stories of the development of the Railway Labor Act and the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act are tales of railroads, robber barons, and free-wheel-
74. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
75. Section 10101(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a) (1982),
provides in relevant part:
Except where policy has an impact on rail carriers, in which case the principles
of section 10101a of this title shall govern, to ensure the development, coordina-
tion, and preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation
needs of the United States ... it is the policy of the United States Government
to provide for the impartial regulation of the modes of transportation subject to
this subtitle ....
Id.
76. For discussion of the remaining contentions, see infra notes 167-72, 192-214 and
accompanying text.
77. See C. Gregory & H. Katz, Labor and the Law 15-16 (3d ed. 1979). See gener-
ally, F. Frankfurter & N. Green, Labor Injunction (1930) (detailing the history of the
labor injunction and laws developed to defeat it); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law
Unionization and Collective Bargaining 1-6 (1976) (giving a brief history of the the inter-
action between the developing labor movement and labor law).
78. See, e.g., Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1970) (discussing the evolution of labor law and the seeming inability of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act) to interact); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793
F.2d 795, 800-01 (7th Cir.) (stating that statutes often fail to interact with each other),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
79. See. e.g., Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1970) (stating that as labor policy shifted over time, Congress passed new laws to meet
these new needs but often did not amend earlier acts still on the books); Burlington
N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 800-01 (7th Cir.) (old
and new statutes often conflict), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
80. See. e.g., Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1970) (Norris-LaGuardia passed to combat the dominance of management over labor, a
situation which "is totally different from that which exists today").
81. See id. (courts must accommodate statutes which have their origins in conflicting
policies).
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ing justice, and of statutory language, ambiguity, and silence. The tales
start with passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.82
During the early part of the twentieth century, employers utilized the
"yellow-dog" contract to keep wages low, hours long, and costs down.,-
These employers, interested in maintaining their power to dictate work-
ing conditions, found willing collaborators in the personae of federal
judges who granted injunctions, often outrageous in their coverage,8
against workers involved in labor disputes. These disputes often included
breaches by employees of covenants not to organize or to strike. The
continued assistance of a sympathetic judiciary thus allowed employers
to frustrate employees' attempts to improve working conditions.
Congress sought to alleviate the plight of the individual worker with
passage of the Clayton Act, 5 primarily by allowing for unionization un-
82. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (§ 20 codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
83. The Senate report on the Norris-LaGuardia Act summarized the "yellow-dog"
contract as follows:
This contract is one which requires the employee, as a condition of obtaining
employment, to agree that he will not join a union while he is in such employ-
ment, or, that if he is then a member of a union, he will disassociate himself
from it; that he recognizes the right of the employer to discharge him without
notice; that he will not quite [sic] without giving to his employer notice suffi-
cient to enable the employer to hire some one to take his place. Such contracts
frequently require the employee to agree in advance to accept such conditions of
labor, hours of labor, etc., as may from time to time be decided upon by his
employer... In all of them the employee waives his right of free association
and genuine representation in connection with his wages, the hours of labor,
and other conditions of employment. In other words, he surrenders his actual
liberty of contract and to a great extent he enters into involuntary servitude.
S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1932).
84. Courts granted injunctions that forbade the payment of strike benefits created by
employee contributions, the giving of any economic assistance to strikers, and permitted
short-notice ejectment from company housing of striking workers and the denial of any
food or fuel assistance to any such tenant. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4506, 4624-25 (1932).
85. Section 20 of the Clayton Act states:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or be-
tween persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or grow-
ing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless
necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the
party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law .... And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person
or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of em-
ployment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recom-
mending. advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from
attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be. for
the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information. or from
peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working: or front
ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute. or from recom-
mending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do:
or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in %uch
dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value: or from peacea-
bly assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purpoes: or from doing any
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interrupted by interference from the federal courts.8 6 Section 20 of the
Clayton Act prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in cases
"involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions
of employment."8 " Protected activities include strikes, peaceful dissemi-
nation of information, picketing, and activities that would be lawful in
the absence of a dispute. 8
The Supreme Court, however, emasculated the legislation by constru-
ing its language narrowly,89 thereby allowing district courts to continue
granting injunctions against labor strikes.9" In Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering,9 the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, which, ap-
plying the Clayton Act, ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin a secondary boycott engineered by the International Association
of Machinists to force Duplex to adopt union wages, an eight hour work
day, and a closed shop.92 The Court based jurisdiction to issue the in-
junction on a construction of the Clayton Act that limited the Act's pro-
scriptions on injunctive relief to cases where privity existed between the
act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any
party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1982)).
86. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649,
653 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub noma. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966); H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4619 (1932); F. Frankfurter & N. Greene,
supra note 77, at 99; C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 77, at 159-60.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). See supra note 85.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). The statute's jurisdictional limitation applies to "any case
between an employer and employees ... or between persons employed and persons seek-
ing employment." Id.
89. The House report and Senate debates on the Norris-LaGuardia Act describe the
destruction wrought upon the Clayton Act by the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), and other cases. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4619 (1932).
90. The courts' restrictive interpretations of the Clayton Act preserved the imbalance
in bargaining power between the individual laborer and capital, which resulted in em-
ployment contracts of adhesion. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1932);
S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 15 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4504 (1932). These
contracts generally required the employee to promise not to join a union or to resign any
present affiliation. See supra note 83. In addition, the laborer surrendered to the em-
ployer the right to fix wages and hours (including wage reductions) and the right to
terminate the employee at any time. See id. The Court's unsympathetic view of outside
union stimulation of labor disputes compounded the problem. See infra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text.
91. 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918), rev'd, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
92. Duplex manufactured huge printing presses that required on-site assembly. Du-
plex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 462 (1921). When a conventional strike
against the primary employer proved ineffective, the union turned to the secondary boy-
cott. Id. at 463-64. Hoping to force Duplex to concede to their demands. the union.
whose rank and file included repairmen and assemblers employed by Duplex customers.
forbade its members to vork on Duplex presses. Id. In addition, it communicated this
policy io owners and potential purchasers of Duplex equipment. Id. Duplex sought to
enjoin the local union officials, who were not Duplex employees, from continuing the
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picketers and the employer.9
3
Two years later, in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cut-
ters' Association of North America,"4 another case involving an attempt
by a union to obtain closed shops,"5 the Court again reversed a lower
court's refusal to issue an injunction against a union-organized secondary
boycott."6 In the protective shadow of Duplex and Bedford, abuses
mounted as employers discovered that they still could take advantage of
sympathetic federal judges to receive injunctive relief against breaches of
the anti-unionization clauses"7 contained in "yellow-dog" contracts as
well as against secondary boycotts. This prevented union organizers
from attempting to close open shops.9 8
In 1926, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act." Railroads, due to
their role as movers and deliverers of goods to the Nation, received indi-
vidualized legislation designed to derail potentially disastrous strikes. "
The Railway Labor Act imposed rigorous dispute resolution proce-
dures lo ' that prevented strikes, at least until those procedures had been
exhausted.' 0 2 Although perhaps not motivated by notions of justice, the
Railway Labor Act seemed to address the needs of everyone fairly: it
kept the industrialists and the general public happy by endeavoring to
keep the trains moving, yet recognized the needs of the railway workers
boycott. Id. at 460-61. The lower courts, applying the Clayton Act, denied the petition.
Id. at 461.
Boycotts involve pressure not to consume a particular product or to engage in a partic-
ular act. See C. Gregory & H. Katz, supra note 77, at 120-21. Pickets, on the other hand,
encourage employees not to report to work.
93. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text and infra notes 117-26, 163-66 and
accompanying text.
94. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
95. See id. at 42-43. The Court stated: -[w]ith a few changes in respect of the product
involved, dates, names and incidents.., the opinion in Dupler Co. r. Deering ... might
serve as an opinion in this case." Id. at 49. This time the employers were operators of
stone quarries that refused to employ union members. The union declared any stone
rough-cut in the quarries in question "unfair" and ordered its membership, which in-
cluded almost all the stone masons in the nation, not to work on the quarries' product.
Id. at 41-46.
96. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n. 9 F.2d 40 (7th
Cir. 1925), rev'd, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
97. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4626, 4689-90 (1932).
98. Id.
99. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §§ 1-14 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1982)).
100. The Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 2. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified a% anmended at
45 U.S.C. § 15la(l) (1982)), states that one of its purposes is: "[to avoid an% interrup-
tion to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein." See' %iipra note I.
101. See Railway Labor Act, ch. 347. §§ 1-14 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified a% amended
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1982)); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.) (court refers to Railuay La),r Act prtcedure%
as "tortuous"), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986): Consolidated Rail Corp lrother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls.. 792 F.2d 303. 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (cotirt %peak% of Railuay
Labor Act procedures as "virtually interminable'*). pettmwn for cert. Iild. 55 1.;S l..W
3303 (U.S. Sept. 2. 1986) (No. 86-353).
102. See .upra note I.
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by instituting a dispute-resolution system that imposed a bargain-in-
good-faith burden on both sides of a dispute,"°3 but left the employees
with the recourse to strike if bargaining failed to result in a settlement. 104
Not all workers, however, were as fortunate as railroad employees. As
late as the 1930's, employers were making free use of the "yellow-dog"
contract'0 5 and courts continued to grant injunctions against secondary
boycotts.'o6 By this time, however, public opinion had coalesced against
capital and its perceived servant, the judiciary. Change in favor of the
worker became a major public goal.' °7 In response, Congress passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932." °8 In doing so, it voiced two concerns:
first, the need for parity in bargaining power between labor and capital in
order to improve the plight of the worker, 10 9 and second, the need to rein
103. Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982)), requires both employees and management subject to
the Act to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes.., in order to avoid
any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dis-
pute between the carrier and the employees thereof." Id.
104. See supra note 1.
105. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4627 (1932).
106. See supra note 97.
107. Public outrage against labor injunctions issued by an activist federal judiciary
reached such proportions that both major parties included planks promising to remedy
the situation in their party platforms. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1932).
Concern for the judiciary's public image and the implications a tarnished image had
upon its continued efficacy also moved Congress. In introducing the proposed legislation
to the Senate, Senator Norris said:
Is it any wonder that there has grown up a feeling of resentment against some
of the actions of some Federal judges? Is it any wonder that there has gradually
grown up in the minds of ordinary people a feeling of prejudice against Federal
courts? Is it surprising that there should develop a sentiment against life tenure
for Federal trial judges? Can anyone doubt that such action on the part of the
Federal judiciary has gradually developed in the minds of ordinary people a fear
that where a system of jurisprudence prevails which enables one man, endowed
with a life tenure of office, to write a law and then order its enforcement, and
then, refusing a jury, to try alleged offenders and punish them at his own sweet
will, it will eventually lead us to the common knowledge and belief that where
such things exist, as Blackstone says, "There can be no public liberty."
75 Cong. Rec. 4507 (1932).
108. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
109. Congress found that only through collective representation could the individual
laborer defeat the "involuntary servitude" imposed upon him by the unchecked power of
management. See S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 9, 14 (1932). Improvement of
the working conditions and wages of the common laborer required virtual bargaining
parity between labor and management. See 79 Cong. Rec. 2371 (1935) (in presenting the
National Labor Relations Act, Senator Wagner stated that "equality of bargaining
power" between labor and management constituted a major labor policy goal): see. e.g..
Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235. 250-51 (1970) (discussing
congressional interest in creating and maintaining balance of bargaining power between
labor and management). See supra note, 56-57 and accompanying text.
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in the activist and increasingly unpopular judiciary.t
Congress patterned the Norris-LaGuardia Act after section 20 of the
Clayton Act"' but crafted the newer legislation of stronger linguistic
cloth to avoid the rending suffered by the Clayton Act at the hands of the
courts.'1 2 The result was a broad prohibition on the power of federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
B. The Legislative History of the Norris-LaGuardia Act Supports the
Conclusion that Congress Intended the Act to Apply to
Secondary Pickets
An examination of the House and Senate reports and floor debate tran-
scripts leading up to passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act indicates that
Congress intended the Act's ban on injunctive relief to encompass secon-
dary picketing." 3 According to the House report on the bill, the drafters
created the law "to protect the rights of labor in the same manner the
Congress intended when it enacted the Clayton Act"' ' -a goal the
Supreme Court frustrated by its decision in Duplex.' ' To ensure this
protection, the drafters of the Norris-LaGuardia Act sought to distin-
guish it from the Clayton Act in several important respects.
First, Congress conveyed its parity concern in wording far more
sweeping than that used in the earlier statute." 6 According to the House
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 25 (1932). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 38-39 and 85 for the text of both acts.
The House report and Senate debates also confirm this. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4625-26 (1932).
112. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (Congress "still further
narrow[ed] the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant injunctions in
labor disputes.").
Senator Blaine, who also helped to present the bill to the Senate, said in debate: "Un-
like [the Clayton Act], however, the provisions of this bill are specific and not capable of
several different interpretations." 75 Cong. Rec. 4630 (1932). See infra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 114-66 and accompanying text.
114. H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
115. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), effectively presented
the unionization of open shops by enabling employers to seek two forms of injunctive
relief: against union organizers not employed at the facility and against employees whose
union affiliations violated the anti-unionization clauses of their employment contracts.
See supra note 97. See also Recent Developments. Railroad Secondar Boycott" Railway
Labor Act Versus Norris-LaGuardia, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 935, 938 (1967) [hereinafter Sec-
ondary Boycotts].
116. A comparison of the language of the two statutes clearly demonstrates this point.
See supra notes 38-39 and 85. For example, section 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
defines a much broader array of labor-management relationships than does the Clayton
Act. Section 113(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act includes "persons participating or in-
terested" in the dispute. See 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1982). In addition, in section 113(c), the
Norris-LaGuardia Act states that no employer-employee relationship need exist between
the labor and management disputants. See id. at § 113(c). The Clayton Act speaks in
more specific relationships such as employer-employee, and "dispute[s] concerning terms
or conditions of employment." See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). More importantly, the Clay-
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report, "[s]ection 13 contains.... a definition of a person participating in
a labor dispute which is broad enough to include others than the immedi-
ate disputants."'"7 The report also expressly declared that the committee
drafted the Act to correct the Supreme Court's Duplex interpretation of
the Clayton Act which limited the Clayton Act's purview to cases involv-
ing a primary employer-employee relationship." 8 Perhaps to emphasize
Congressional disapproval of Duplex, the Senate report contains lan-
guage reminiscent of the Justice Brandeis' analogy, in his Duplex dissent,
of labor-management relations to warfare on an industrial level." 19 This
"no-holds-barred" approach to unionization indicates that Congress
meant to include secondary pickets within the Act's domain.
Second, congressional citation to the Supreme Court's decisions in Du-
plex '20 and Bedford 121 as stimuli for the new Act provides concrete sup-
port for the position that Congress intended the Act to cover secondary
activity. In Duplex, the union turned to secondary boycotting when con-
ventional striking proved ineffective.122 In Bedford, the union resorted to
the secondary boycott to combat the quarries' refusal to employ union
members. 12 3 In both cases, hardship to the secondary employer consti-
tuted a key element of the secondary boycott. 124 The union testified in
Bedford that such activity would harm local purchasers of the stone, but
that the union intended to utilize secondary pressure to achieve unioniza-
tion regardless of whether it damaged neutral parties. 25 In both cases,
the Supreme Court held that the Clayton Act permitted federal courts to
enjoin secondary picketing. 126 Disapproving citations to these decisions
ton Act allows federal courts to issue injunctions "to prevent irreparable injury to prop-
erty, or to a property right." See id. The Norris-LaGuardia Act contains no such
exception. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113 (1982). See also H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7-8 (1932) (to prevent similar misconstruction, Norris-LaGuardia language more
specific than Clayton Act's).
117. H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932).
118. The House report reads:
In the case of Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering ... the court held so far
as pertinent to this particular discussion that this section of the Clayton Act
provided a restriction upon the use of the injunctions in favor only of the imme-
diate disputants and that other members of the union not standing in the proxi-
mate relation of employer and employee could be enjoined. Of course, it is
fundamental that a strike is generally an idle gesture if confined only to the
immediate disputants.
H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1932) (citation omitted).
119. See S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932).
120. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1932).
121. 75 Cong. Rec. 4625 (1932).
122. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 462-63 (1921).
123. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n. 274 U.S. 37. 42-
43 (1927).
124. See id. at 45-46; see, e.g., Duplex, 254 U.S. at 462-63 (outline of facts detailing
measures designed to cause hardship to secondary employers).
125. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n. 274 U.S. 37. 45
(1927).
126. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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found in congressional debates and reports clearly indicate that Congress
approved of the use of secondary boycotts and pickets, and sought to
remedy this judicial misinterpretation.
C. The Norris-LaGuardia Act in Light of the National Labor
Relations and Taft-Hartley Acts
The subsequent passage of the Taft-Hartley Act' 7 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act'28 also indicate that Congress originally
intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to protect secondary picketing. The
National Labor Relations Act governs most labor disputes, 29 and, as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, makes secondary pickets and boycotts
illegal in most labor disputes. 30 Congress, however, exempted disputes
covered by the Railway Labor Act from the National Labor Relations
Act's purview.13  This subsequent prohibition against secondary activity
supports two important conclusions: first, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
must cover secondary picketing, 32 otherwise subsequent legislation
127. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
128. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
129. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
801 (7th Cir.), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
131. See 29 U.S.C. § 182 (1982). Congress also limited the availability of the statute's
remedies to the National Labor Relations Board. Private citizens may file a complaint
with the National Labor Relations Board but may not institute a court action for viola-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. See
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1234
(1st Cir. 1986) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982)).
132. Between passage of the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts, courts held that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act protected secondary picketing. See Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1940); East
Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10. 10-11 (5th
Cir. 1947); Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F.2d 931. 932 (10th
Cir. 1942); Taxi-Cab Drivers Local Union No. 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co.. 123
F.2d 262, 264-65 (10th Cir. 1941).
With passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress hoped to achieve bargaining par-
ity between labor and management. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
The congressional documentation supporting subsequent passage of the National la-
bor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), and the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to it. ch. 120. 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982 & Supp. II1 1985)).
indicates that Congress intended for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to sanction secondary
activity. The House report on the Taft-Hartley amendments states that the Act repre-
sented a further step towards the goal of achieving parity in labor-management relations.
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1947). This goal mirrored that of the
National Labor Relations Act. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7569 (1935). Some sections of the
National Labor Relations Act derive from Norris-LaGuardia language. See id.
Furthermore, the Act concerns itself with the elimination of the "'yellow-dog" con-
tract. See id. at 7570. Finally, Sen. Wagner justified the bill by saying that though Con-
gress had protected the same policies in previous legislation. the working man required
substantive law to make him feel secure. See id. at 7570-71. Thus. with the National
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would not have been necessary; and, second, since Congress specifically
exempted railway labor cases from the amendments' coverage, secondary
picketing remains available to striking railway workers.' 3
Some proponents of the availability of injunctive relief against secon-
dary pickets in railway disputes argue that the railway exemption from
the National Labor Relations Act represents a congressional over-
sight."1 They argue that since Congress banned secondary picketing for
Labor Relations Act, Congress made substantively legal what it had made practically
legal under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Consistent with the inequality between labor and management, the National Labor
Relations Act applied only to management. See id. By 1947, the balance of power be-
tween labor and management had shifted to the point where Congress concluded that
management needed some protection against the unions, see 93 Cong. Rec. 3834 (1947),
and so it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in relevant part as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982)).
These amendments added "unfair labor practices", ch. 120, title I, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 140-41
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982)), to complement the "[u]nfair labor
practices by employer[s]" outlined in the National Labor Relations Act passed in 1935,
ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452-53 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982),
and included a ban on secondary boycotts. See ch. 120, title I, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 140-41
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). Congress excluded cases subject to
the Railway Labor Act from the amendments' purview. See infra note 138. Under this
framework, Congress left secondary activity available in cases governed by the Railway
Labor Act. Id.
Although in United Steelworkers v. National Labor Relations Bd., 376 U.S. 492
(1964), the Supreme Court found that when Congress revised section 158(b) (often re-
ferred to by its sessions law section number-8(b)) in 1959, it intended to extend the
provision to cover railroad workers by expanding the definition of employee, 1d. at 500-
01, the Court later reversed on this point, holding that the new definition of employee did
not bring railway workers within § 158(b)(4). See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 376-77 n. 10 (1969). But see Perritt, supra note
4, at 1221-23. Continued availability of secondary boycotts in cases covered by the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act is consistent with this history.
133. In Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Tranportation Indus., 803
F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986), the court noted first that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited
injunctions against secondary picketing, see id. at 1232-33, then outlined subsequent con-
gressional action redefining the kind of labor activities available. See id. at 1233-34. The
court observed that Congress eliminated the secondary boycott from labor's self-help ar-
senal with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, see id. at 1234, but exempted
railroads therefrom. See id. See also Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title II, § 212. 61 Stat.
156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 182 (1982)). Congress then plugged "loopholes" with
the Landum-Griffin Act in 1959, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.). See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1234 (1st Cir. 1986). From this, the court concluded that Congress could alter the
status quo to eliminate secondary picketing in railway disputes if it wanted to. but had
not done so, and the court could not step in to make the change. See id.
134. For example, in Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.. 793
F.2d 795 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986), the railroads contended that
"Congress could not have meant railroads, alone among America's principal industries,
to be exposed to secondary picketing." Id. at 796. This court turned this argument
against its proponents. It suggested that a finding that secondary picketing was prohib-
ited in railway labor disputes must be based on a finding that the Railway Labor Act
prohibited them. If that were so, the court reasoned, then railroads would have been
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every other major American industry,'35 its failure to do so for the rail-
way industry must constitute an inadvertent omission. 3 6 A number of
courts have considered this unintentional exception rationale'3 and con-
cluded that no support exists for this position.
First, since Congress passed the Railway Labor Act exemption to-
gether with the Taft-Hartley amendments, 31 it seems unlikely that any
oversight occurred. Second, a blanket exemption from the National La-
bor Relations Act of disputes covered by the Railway Labor Act makes
sense: without it, the National Labor Relations Act would undermine
the Railway Labor Act by nullifying its specific dispute resolution proce-
dures. 139 Third, Congress exempted other groups from National Labor
Relations Act coverage, including crucial service organizations like the
Postal Service.,' Last, Congress has amended the Railway Labor Act
protected from secondary picketing when no other industry was. See id. at 801. See also
Perritt, supra note 4, at 1204; Secondary Boycotts, supra note 115, at 944.
135. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
801 (7th Cir.), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
136. See id. at 796.
137. In Brotherhood of R.R.Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), the Supreme Court sua sponte raised this issue of National Labor Relations Act/
Norris-LaGuardia Act interaction. It held that while the National Labor Relations Act
provisions may be used very generally as guidelines to determine what self-help tech-
niques remain available to parties to disputes subject to the Railway Labor Act, they may
not be read to outlaw secondary picketing in railway disputes. Id. at 391-93. See also
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1232-
34 (1st Cir. 1986) (language of Norris-LaGuardia clearly allows secondary picketing, and
Congress has not passed any limitation similar to Taft-Hartley restriction on secondary
picketing for Railway Labor Act cases); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 796, 801 (7th Cir.) (court rejected railroad's oversight argu-
ment), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp.
Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1980) (court found that National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, could serve only as a guidepost to federal labor policy, but
could not be imported wholesale into the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
138. Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which contained an express
exemption, ch. 120, title II, § 212, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 182
(1982)), for disputes subject to the Railway Labor Act on June 23, 1947. The Supreme
Court, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), asserted that Congress passed both sections fully aware that the secondary picket-
ing provisions would not apply to railroads. See id. at 391.
139. Each act provides procedural steps for the handling of labor-management interac-
tion. These procedural schemes must be independent to be effective. In Jacksonville Ter-
ninal Co., 394 U.S. 369, the Supreme Court observed that the National Labor Relations
Act orginated in the shadow of the Railway Labor Act and that Congress never intended
for the two to interact. See id. at 376-77. The Court also stated that if it were to find that
"major" and "minor" railway disputes were subject to National Labor Relations Board
jurisdiction where not all employees participating in the dispute were subject to the Rail-
way Labor Act, then Railway Labor Act procedures would become subordinate to the
National Labor Relations Board unless the Board found it lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 375-
76.
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982). Airlines, whose regulation falls under the Railway
Labor Act, also share that Act's exemption from the National Labor Relations Act. See
45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 182 (1982).
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numerous times since it enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments,1 4 and
these Railway Labor Act alterations have never included a ban on secon-
dary pickets to remedy the alleged oversight. 42 Some of these amend-
ments even postdate the 1966 Fifth Circuit decision 43 that propounded
the substantial alignment/economic self-interest test. While congres-
sional silence may not be interpreted as assent to judicial constructions
given the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'" it is fair to assume that Congress,
which often must settle railroad strikes through legislation, 145 is aware
that the secondary picketing issue arises in the railway context but has
not chosen to amend either the Railway Labor Act or the National La-
bor Relations Act to prohibit secondary railroad pickets.' 46
D. The Scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is Not Limited by the
Legislative History of the Clayton Act
Some have claimed that since the Norris-LaGuardia Act was meant to
reassert the purpose of the Clayton Act, 147 it should be limited by the
intent underlying the original legislation. 14  Advocates of this theory
first pointed to congressional reports stating that in passing the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, Congress adopted the same methods to protect labor
that it had used in the Clayton Act. '1 They offered these statements as
an entree to investigate Clayton Act legislative history' 50 and then
141. Congress amended the Railway Labor Act in 1948, 1949 (twice), 1951, 1964,
1966, 1970 (twice), and 1981. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1982). See also Burlington
N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 802 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
142. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1982).
143. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649
(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966). See supra note 141.
144. See Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970)("'[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a con-
trolling rule of law' ") (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)).
145. Between 1963 and 1973, Congress passed nine laws to prevent or end real or
threatened railroad strikes. See Staff of House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com-
merce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. Background Information concerning Railway Labor Act and
Current Railway Labor-Management Dispute (Railway Employee Dept.) 39-48 (14
Comm. Print 1974). Congress also passed legislation to end strikes in 1982, see Act of
Sept. 22, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-262, 96 Stat. 1130, and in 1987. See Act of Jan. 28, 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-2, 101 Stat. 4.
146. See Note, Judicial Approaches to Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor
Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 928, 943-44 (1967); cf., Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v.
Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1986) (legislative silence on secon-
dary picketing under Railway Labor Act cannot be read to reflect implied prohibition).
147. See supra note 114.
148. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1366 (8th
Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 362 F.2d 649,
658-59 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen. 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
149. See cases cited supra note 148.
150. Id. The court in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362
F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub non. Atlantic
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pointed to House debates during which the committee spokesman opined
that the Clayton Act did not legalize secondary boycotts.' The Court
in Duplex, holding that an injunction would issue under the Clayton Act
unless privity existed,' 5 ' itself cited to indirect negative references to sec-
ondary boycotts contained in House and Senate committee reports.'1 3
This entire theory, however, rests on the incorrect assumption that con-
gressional intent to reassert its judicially emasculated purpose in passing
the Clayton Act necessarily precluded other purposes in the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.' 54
Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded early on that the Norris-La-
Guardia Act represents a congressional redefinition of Clayton Act pur-
poses. In United States v. Hutcheson,' decided in 1941, the Court stated
that in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress had rejected the Du-
plex and Bedford readings of the Clayton Act,' 5 6 and had "now placed
its own meaning upon that section. The Norris-LaGuardia Act reas-
serted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by infusing into it the
immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act."'t5 7
Opponents of a broad interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
have also pointed to remarks made by Representative LaGuardia during
Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966), relied on this
notion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act derived from the Duplex dissent to support the
economic self-interest/substantial alignment exception that excepted neutral secondary
employers from Norris-LaGuardia coverage.
151. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 at 658-59 (Choate, J., dissenting)(quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 9652 (1914)), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
152. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
153. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), cites to the identical
House and Senate reports that contain a series of quoted passages on labor organization,
some of which include statements condemning secondary activity. See id. at 475 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-36 (1914); S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong.. 2d
Sess. 29-31 (1914)). Although the Court itself deemed the statements inconclusive, id.. it
found the condemnation of secondary boycotts it was seeking in the floor debate remarks
of Mr. Webb, the House committee spokesman. Id. at 475, n. I (quoting 51 Cong. Rec.
9652 (1914)).
154. Indeed, the Norris-LaGuardia Act includes a section aimed at contempt charges
against newspaper publishers-a section without parallel in the Clayton Act. 29 U.S.C.§ 112 (repealed 1948). For discussion of this section's goals, see 75 Cong. Rec. 4509.
4758-59 (1932); see also Secondary Boycotts, supra note 115, at 937 (although Congress
may have passed Norris-LaGuardia in part to protect economic self-interest. "it does not
necessarily follow that [the interest] was intended to determine the scope of the act").
155. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
156. Id. at 236. Hutcheson involved an allegation that picketing resulted in a criminal
antitrust violation. The Court held that the Clayton Act definition of a labor dispute was
to be redefined according to Norris-LaGuardia standards. Id. at 233-34. It then ruled
the activity protected. Id.
157. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). The Senate debates also support the view that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act affords broader protection than does the Clayton Act. For exam-
pie, Sen. Blaine, who, along with Sen. Norris, presented the bill before the Senate. stated
that the proposed bill "'does not repeal the labor sections of the Clayton Act but merely
supplements these provisions and clarifies the intent of Congress." 75 Cong. Rec. 4626
(1932) (emphasis added).
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the House debates where he stated that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
limited in application to employer-employee relationships.' When
seeking legislative intent, however, conflicts between committee reports
and comments made by the committee representative on the floor during
debate must be resolved in favor of the committee report." 9 As previ-
ously noted, the committee reports for the Norris-LaGuardia Act clearly
indicate that the committee meant for the Act to apply to labor disputes
where no employer-employee privity exists.'6° Representative LaGuar-
dia's comments do not appear in the House reports,' 6 1 the authoritative
statement of Congressional intent.162
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad
Co. dissent asserted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects non-employ-
ees as well as employees, but only if they direct their activities against the
primary employer.' 63 According to this view, Congress included the lack
of privity language in the Norris-LaGuardia Act only to prevent the re-
currence of Duplex, which, in part, kept union members who were not
employed by the primary employer from picketing that employer. 65 As
already noted, however, Duplex, as well as Bedford, also entailed pres-
sure against secondary employers. 166 The committee reports' unequivo-
cal rejection of both cases demonstrates that Congress approved of
158. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
804-05 (7th Cir.) (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 5499 (1932)), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 658-59 & n.7
(5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting) (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 5499 (1932)), aff'd per curian by
an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Train-
men, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
159. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1921) (citing
Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904)); N. Singer, supra note 35, § 48.08, at
315. Inherently less authoritative than the congressional reports, but still acceptable, are
the remarks of committee spokesmen made during debate. Duplex, 254 U.S. at 475 (cit-
ing United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918); United States v.
Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281 (1916); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Min-
ing Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99, (1913); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904);
N. Singer, supra note 35, § 48.13 at 329-30.
160. See supra notes 117-18.
161. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932).
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th
Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nomn. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966), Judge Choate, in his dissent, con-
tended that Congress included this lack of privity clause in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
solely to cover situations like Duplex, where the Court construed the Clayton Act to ban
injunctive relief only where an employer-employee relationship existed, thus placing labor
action organized by unions outside the Clayton Act protections. See id. at 656-57.
Two courts dealing with the current interchange cases raised this idea sua sponte and
rejected it. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803
F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1986); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
164. See supra note 163.
165. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443. 471-74 (1921).
166. See supra notes 91-96 and 107-08 and accompanying text.
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pressure applied to "neutral" parties, not simply to the primary employer
by activities of non-employee union members.
E. Congress Intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Cover Railway
Labor Disputes
To avoid Norris-LaGuardia Act applicability to secondary railroad
pickets, the dissent in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Co. asserted that Congress never intended for the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to apply to railway disputes.' 67 In his dissent,
Judge Choate cited to Representative LaGuardia's floor debate com-
ments that the Act, if passed, would not apply to railroad disputes.' 6
The committee reports are silent on this matter, 69 but Representative
LaGuardia himself later cast doubt upon the accuracy of this assertion
by stating that railroads strongly supported passage of the bill.'7 In ad-
dition, during the Senate floor debate, Senators Norris and Blaine cited
employment practices utilized by railroads to demonstrate the need for
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' Last, neither the statutory text
nor the congressional reports expressly or impliedly exempt any particu-
lar industry from coverage.'7 2
F. No Support Exists for an "Economic Self-Interest/Substantial
Alignment" Exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Unlike the arguments that deny that the Norris-LaGuardia Act ap-
plies to secondary picketing 7 3 or boycotts of any kind, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the statute applied to secondary picketing but created
an exception to it in the form of an "economic self-interest/substantial
alignment" test.' 4 Support for this test, however, cannot be found in the
167. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649,
658-59 & nn.6-7 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'dper curiam by an equally dided
Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20
(1966).
168. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 659
n.7 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
169. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1972).
170. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
804-05 (7th Cir.) (quoting 75 Cong. Rec. 5499 (1932)), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
Indeed, this same page of the Congressional Record relates the defeat of an amendment
to the Norris-LaGuardia Act that would have excluded the Railway Labor Act from its
coverage. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803
F.2d 1228. 1233 & n.35 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing 75 Cong. Rec. 5499 (1932)).
171. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4626, 4629 (1932).
172. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932):
S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
173. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 362 F.2d 649,
653-54 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiamn by an equally divided Court sub non. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
174. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the policies underlying
the Act, or the dissenting opinion in Duplex, 7 ' from which it allegedly
sprang.
In its decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co.,' 76 the Fifth Circuit cited Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Duplex as both a moving force behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act'7 7 and
as the origin of the economic self-interest test.7 8 Justice Brandeis noted
that there existed a common law justification of self-interest in the con-
text of secondary boycotts, warranting injury to the secondary employer
on a self-defense theory. 179 The economic self-interest/substantial align-
ment test, derived from this self-defense theory, requires that the secon-
dary employer interfere with the union's interests.18 0 According to the
Fifth Circuit, the test is satisfied when the secondary employer "align[s]
himself with the primary employer in some substantial manner," thus
threatening the union's economic interest by influencing the outcome of
the labor dispute.' 8 '
Initially, it is worth noting that in looking to the Brandeis dissent for
its new test, the Fifth Circuit makes the faulty assumption that passage
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to correct the Duplex holding necessarily
implies congressional adoption of the dissenting position.,82 No histori-
175. See 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176. 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub non.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
177. Id. at 654.
178. Id.
179. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 480-84 (1921) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
180. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
181. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 654-55
(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
182. Neither the committee reports nor the Congressional Record support this asser-
tion. See H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 3370-7122 (1932).
Many courts have criticized this test's lack of foundation. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170, n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) (Norris-
LaGuardia language expansive, limitation unjustified), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3165 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint.
of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (Norris-LaGuardia language expan-
sive, limitation unjustified), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26. 1986)(No. 86-503); Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d
1298, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Norris-LaGuardia language expansive, limitation unjusti-
fied); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 805-07(7th Cir.) (rejecting economic self-interest/substantial alignment exception and criticizing
Eighth Circuit conclusion that Norris-LaGuardia language is vague and leads to absurd
result), ceri. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); see also Smith's Management Corp. v. Intern-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 357. 737 F.2d 788. 790-92
(9th Cir. 1984) (a non-Railway Labor Act case holding Supreme Court consistently con-
strued Norris-LaGuardia language broadly); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 657 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting) (calling the excep-
tion's origins "uncertain" and questioning the majority's motives in developing the excep-
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cal support exists for this assertion.' 83Therefore, even if the dissent can
be read to support the economic self-interest/substantial alignment
test,' 84 no foundation exists for finding Justice Brandeis' theory em-
braced in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'85
Nevertheless, the Brandeis dissent does take exception to the Duplex
majority's denial of the right to boycott secondary employers.'1 6 To as-
sert, however, that this stance supports the economic self-interest test is
to miss the point entirely. The core of the Brandeis dissent lies in his
objection to the issuance of an injunction at all. 8 Justice Brandeis read
the statute to deny federal courts the power to enjoin boycotts in labor
disputes, without regard to whether the secondary boycott would injure
neutral third parties.'88
Of even greater significance, Justice Brandeis recognized that while
public interest might require limits on this economic "free-for-all", only
the legislature and not the courts may define these limitations., 9 Thus,
the dissenting opinion that the Fifth Circuit offered as support for this
new exception argued vehemently against any judge-made exceptions to
the congressional ban on injunctive relief.
In passing the Clayton Act, and later the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Con-
gress intended to take federal courts out of the "injunction granting busi-
ness"' 9 0 in labor dispute cases. To propose any type of exception to this
broad prohibition would directly contravene congressional purpose by
tion), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
183. See supra note 182.
184. Justice Brandeis' economic self-interest justification would allow secondary pick-
eting only where the picketing protected the union's economic interests. See Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479-83, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Presumably, neutral parties would not threaten these interests.
185. But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d
649, 653-54 (5th Cir.) (the Duplex dissent, in conjunction with Congress' passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, justifies the economic self-interest/substantial alignment excep-
tion's existence), aff'd per curiamn by an equally divided Court sub nora. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966). Though Congress did
enact the Norris-LaGuardia Act to correct the Court's interpretation of the Clayton Act,
see supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text, no support exists for the notion that Con-
gress adopted Justice Brandeis' position in his Duplex dissent. Id.
186. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 486-88 (1921) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
187. Justice Brandeis addressed the issue of economic self-interest because the union
raised it. See id. at 480. Although he found the justification valid, he stated that the
interests of the community at large limit this justification. See id. at 488. According to
Justice Brandeis, the key to the Clayton Act, ignored by the majority, lay in the denial of
jurisdiction to federal courts to grant such injunctions at all: Congress had reserved for
itself judgment regarding the availability of union self-help activities. See id., at 485-88.
188. Justice Brandeis wrote: "By 1914 the ideas of the advocates of legislation had
fairly crystallized upon the manner in which the inequality and uncertainty of the law
should be removed. It was to be done by expressly legalizing certain acts regardless of
the effects produced by them upon other persons." Id. at 485-86.
189. See supra note 187.
190. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649. 653
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placing the courts back in their post-Duplex, pre-Norris-LaGuardia Act
stance: free to weigh the relative merits of the secondary picket and to
grant or deny relief accordingly. 9' Thus, the much-criticized economic
self-interest/substantial alignment test finds no support for its existence
in either the Brandeis dissent or the legislative history of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.
III. THE INTERCHANGE CASES Do NOT REQUIRE NORRIS-
LAGUARDIA ACT ACCOMMODATION TO EITHER THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT OR THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT
Several parties have argued and several courts have held that the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against labor injunctions in cases involv-
ing secondary railway pickets should give way to accommodate the
general purposes of the Railway Labor Act,' 92 the Interstate Commerce
(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
191. Supreme Court decisions consistently state that any type of judicial activity in
cases falling within the purview of the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions violates its purpose.
See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457
U.S. 702, 711-12 (1982) (a political secondary boycott arising out of the Soviet Union's
invasion of Afghanistan held within Act's purview); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Pan-
ama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1960) (a picket by non-employees of a Liberian ship
which hired non-union help at substandard wages subject to Act's controls); Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1960) (rail-
road's efforts to close down station houses, resulting in loss of jobs to unionized employ-
ees, and railroad's subsequent refusal to negotiate regarding the loss of jobs constituted a
labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia Act).
Three of the circuit courts deciding the interchange issue drew on such Supreme Court
decisions to support the denial of injunctive relief. See Central Vermont Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[t]he vice of the
economic self-interest test is that it puts the courts back in the business of second-guess-
ing a union's decisions about how best to pursue its members' welfare."); Burlington
N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 805-07 (7th Cir.) (Con-
gress passed Norris-LaGuardia Act to prevent courts from evaluating union needs and
the economic self-interest/substantial alignment exception requires courts to do just
that), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of
Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986) ("A contrary result would lead
to the freewheeling judicial interference that the Act was meant to prevent."), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
192. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 796, 799 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit reversed district court
finding that secondary dispute constituted "major" dispute under Railway Labor Act and
must be submitted to Railway Labor Act procedures), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986):
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Second Circuit reversed district court holding that Railway Labor Act proce-
dures must be exhausted as to secondary dispute prior to invocation of Norris-LaGuardil
protections), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1368-69 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Ashley, Drew and Northern argued secondary picketing must be submitted to Railway
Labor Act procedures and Norris-LaGuardia Act must accommodate these); set also
Richmond, F. & R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161. 1167-68
(4th Cir. 1986) (Widener, J., dissenting) (broad reading of Norris-LaGuardia Act doe,
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Act,' 93 or both. This theory of accommodation, however, contradicts
the weight of authority.
When confronted with the task of harmonizing conflicting statutes,
courts have distinguished between statutes with a general purpose and
statutes that impose specific procedural requirements.' 94 Only the latter
require accommodation. 9 ' Such a distinction prevents a general statute
not allow for accommodation of Railway Labor Act purposes), petition for cert. filed, 55
U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503).
A subsidiary argument offered by some courts, but distinguishable from the facts at
hand, requires Norris-LaGuardia accommodation of the Railway Labor Act where par-
ties to the primary dispute have not exhausted Railway Labor Act procedures. See
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. RtR. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40-42
(1957); Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228,
1233 (1st Cir. 1986).
193. 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a) (1982). See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit reversed district court holding
that Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable where secondary activity is aimed at forcing rail-
road to violate Interstate Commerce Act obligations), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986);
see also Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161,
1167 (4th Cir. 1986) (Widener, J., dissenting) (broad reading of Norris-LaGuardia Act
does not allow for accommodation of Interstate Commerce Act purposes), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Brotherhood of LR.
Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 659 n.7 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J.,
dissenting) (broad interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia Act would allow for interference
with interstate commerce-something Congress did not intend), aff'd by an equally di-
vided Court sub nor. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385
U.S. 20 (1966).
Railroads have offered accommodation to Interstate Commerce Act purposes as a jus-
tification for granting injunctive relief. See Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir. 1986) (Widener, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 655 (5th Cir.), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court sub nor. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
194. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457
U.S. 702, 708 (1982); Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-53
(1970); Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228,
1233 (1st Cir. 1986); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
795 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept.
26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793
F.2d 795, 802-03 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
195. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457
U.S. 702, 708 (1982) (Court has authorized injunctions under Norris-LaGuardia Act
"only in limited situations where necessary to accommodate the Act to specific federal
legislation or paramount congressional policy"); Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Lo-
cal 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-54 (1970) (Norris-LaGuardia Act must accommodate § 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act in order to protect its procedural integrity):
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1233
(1st Cir. 1986) (specific mandate of Norris-LaGuardia Act should not yield to the general
purposes of the Railway Labor Act); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing a conflicting general purpose of
another statute is insufficient to overcome Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503): Burlington N.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 802-03 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing
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from undercutting specifically legislated procedural solutions.'96 Accord-
ingly, three circuits in the recent railway secondary picketing cases held
that the general purposes of the Railway Labor Act prove insufficient to
overcome the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 197
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Em-
ployees,19 (Conrail), one of the cases arising out of the Maine Central
dispute, the district court took this failed argument one step further,
holding that the secondary dispute must be subjected to Railway Labor
Act procedures to accord with the Act's purposes. 99 This argument
simply lacks merit.
Under the facts of these cases, application of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act undermines neither the general purposes nor the specific procedures
of the Railway Labor Act. First, the strikes and the subsequent secon-
dary picketing only occurred after Railway Labor Act procedures had
been exhausted. 2" The Railway Labor Act is silent as to what happens
when its dispute resolution procedures fail,20 but courts have implied
the availability of self-help without limitation.2 "2 Second, disputes be-
tween unions and secondary employers fall outside the bounds of the
Railway Labor Act. The Railway Labor Act covers "major" and "mi-
nor" disputes.2" 3 A major dispute concerns proposed changes in terms
and conditions of employment,2" while a minor dispute involves the in-
terpretation or application of agreements.2 °5 BMWE's picketing of the
between statutes establishing goals and statutes establishing procedure-only the latter
require accommodation by Norris-LaGuardia Act), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 305 (2d
Cir. 1986) (specific provisions of Norris-LaGuardia should not give way to vague obliga-
tion to negotiate under Railway Labor Act), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303
(U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353).
196. E.g., Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970); see
Note, supra note 146, at 935; Secondary Boycotts, supra note 115, at 941.
197. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1986); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259
(U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 802-03 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1986),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353); Secondary
Boycotts, supra note 115, at 941.
198. 792 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept.
2, 1986) (No. 86-353) (district court held that secondary dispute must undergo Railway
Labor Act procedures).
199. Id. at 304.
200. BMWE and Maine Central exhausted Railway Labor Act procedures before
BMWE struck. See supra note 1.
201. See supra notes I and 17 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 1. See also Secondary Boycotts, supra note 115. at 940-41.
203. These terms are not contained in the statute. They developed as a shorthand for
courts, Congress, and the railway industry. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley. 325 U.S.
711. 722-25 (1945), aff 'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
204. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1982).
205. See 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1982).
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secondary employers resulted from the secondary employers' interchange
agreements with the primary employer, not from any dispute between
the secondary employer and its BMWE employees.20 6 Since secondary
picketing fits neither definition, it is not a dispute which is arbitrable
under the Railway Labor Act.207
The district court's Conrail ruling also represents bad policy. By en-
joining the picketing pending arbitration, the courts remove manage-
ment's incentive to bargain in good faith since settlement of the primary
dispute long before the lengthy Railway Labor Act procedures have been
exhausted effectively neutralizes the secondary picket as a weapon in the
railway union's arsenal.20 8
In addition to the Railway Labor Act accommodation argument, some
litigants and courts have expressed the concern that liability could befall
the secondary employer unable to meet its Interstate Commerce Act obli-
gations 20 9 due to a shutdown caused by secondary picketing.2 0 The
206. The union's sole complaint with the secondary employer in all of the 1986 in-
terchange cases is the same: the secondary employer continues an important business
relationship with Maine Central--one that helps the Maine Central operate in the face of
the BMWE walkout. E.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.,
793 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir.), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
The Railway Labor Act also provides for mediation of "[a]ny other dispute ... not
adjusted in conference between the parties or where conferences are refused." 45 U.S.C.
§ 155 (1982). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pointed out in Cen-
tral Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir.
1986), this category also seems to require privity between the disputing parties. There-
fore, it does not apply to the interchange cases.
207. See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1231-32 (1st Cir. 1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 795 F.2d 1169, 1170 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3165
(U.S. Aug. 1, 1986) (No. 86-175); Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 795 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.LW.
3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 802-03 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 792 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No. 86-353); Ashley,
Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1369 (8th Cir. 1980); Note,
supra note 146, at 933; Secondary Boycotts, supra note 115, at 939.
208. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls.. 792 F.2d 303.
304-05 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1986) (No.
86-353).
The Burlington court noted that removal of access to picketing, including secondary
picketing, undermines the Railway Labor Act by removing management's incentive to
bargain since it would not be motivated by fear of strikes. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 802-03 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
60 (1986).
209. 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a) (1982) in relevant part provides that "[a] common carrier
providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under chapter 105 of this title shall provide the transportation or %ermice on
reasonable request." Id. See Note, supra note 146. at 940.
210. Interstate Commerce Act obligations in this context consist of "pros id[ing] 'Nafe
and adequate' transportation service 'on reasonable request'." AshleN. Drew & N Ry. v.
United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting 49 U.S.C. §
11101(a) (1982)). See Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empl,. v. Guilford Transp. Indus..
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court in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees,21' one of the recent interchange cases, effectively re-
jected this argument, stating that no court would punish an organization
for failing to do something it would choose to do but for the strike.212
Furthermore, the court noted, it had never happened to date.213 In addi-
tion, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that "'unlawfulness under nonlabor
legislation [does] not remove the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.' ,214
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
Courts have raised several policy arguments in favor of a narrow con-
struction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 5 Policies supporting a broad
construction, however, outweigh those supporting a narrow one.216
The strongest policy argument against broadly interpreting the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to deny federal courts jurisdiction to grant injunctive re-
lief in secondary picketing situations is one of fairness. In putting forth
the economic self-interest/substantial alignment test, the Fifth Circit rea-
soned that it might be unfair to deny a party relief in the face of secon-
dary picketing if the complainant had contributed minimally, if at all, to
the underlying dispute.217
803 F.2d 1228, 1234-35 (1st Cir. 1986); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of
Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 800 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Ashley,
Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1980);
Brotherhood of R.R: Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 655 (5th Cir.),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Broth-
erhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966) (citing Order of R.R. Tels. v. Chicago & N.
W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 339 n.15 (1960)).
211. 793 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986)
(No. 86-39).
212. Id. at 800. Accord Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d at 1235.
213. Id.
214. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d at 655, (quoting Order of Railroad Telegra-
phers v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 339 n.15 (1960)) (brackets not in
original).
215. These include fairness to the neutral secondary employer-the motivation under-
lying the economic self-interest/substantial alignment exception-see infra notes 216-25,
inconvenience to the immediate and national community, see infra notes 228-36 and ac-
companying text, and the danger of abusive resort to secondary picketing, see infra notes
237-39 and accompanying text.
216. The issue of fairness is inextricably linked to the economic self-interest/substan-
tial alignment exception. In Ashley, Drew & N. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357
(8th Cir. 1980), the court concerned itself with the hardship suffered by both the secon-
dary employer and by the community. See id. at 1364-65. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 658 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting).
aff'd per curia? by an equally divided Court sub noin. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Broth-
erhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966) focused on the hardship suffered by tile
neutral secondary employer. See id. at 658.
217. Judge Choate's Atlantic Coast Line dissent expresses his concern about the unfair-
ness of allowing a neutral secondary employer to be picketed and possibly shut down.
since the neutral secondary employer stands powerless to affect the outcome of the dis-
236 [Vol. 55
1986] SECONDARY PICKETING IN RAIL WAY DISPUTES 237
The facts of Ashley, Drew & Northern Raihvay Co. v. United Transpor-
tation Unio218 demonstrate the type of situation envisioned by the Fifth
Circuit. There, United Transportation Union picketing at Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad's Fordyce railyard shut down the two-
man Fordyce & Princeton railroad."z 9 A wholly-owned subsidiary of
Georgia Pacific, Fordyce & Princeton's sole function consisted of serv-
icing the parent company's plant.220 In response to the strike, Ashley,
Drew & Northern, another Georgia-Pacific subsidiary that shared a com-
mon management with Fordyce & Princeton, sent management person-
nel to operate the Fordyce & Princeton train.22' These management
personnel performed only those interchanges necessary to move the
Georgia-Pacific traffic. 2  When the strikers learned that Ashley, Drew
& Northern was responsible for Fordyce & Princeton's continued opera-
tion, they established pickets at Ashley, Drew & Northern's headquar-
ters. 2 3 Successful picketing of Ashley, Drew & Northern would in turn
shut down the Georgia-Pacific plant, leaving three thousand people un-
employed. 224 Thus, when the secondary activity necessarily paralyzes
the neutral secondary employer (as distinguished from simply pressuring
the secondary employer not to aid the primary employer in any way),
22 5
the secondary activity compounds the unfairness to the neutral employer
and possibly to the community as well.
One justification for permitting potentially paralyzing secondary activ-
ity against neutral secondary employers exists in the unique nature of the
railway industry where interchanges play a key role. As demonstrated
by the Guilford strike,226 much of a railroad's traffic may be carried by
other railroads, transferred to the primary employer's trains at railyards
pute. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 658
(5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiai by an equally divided Court sub nora.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
218. 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980).
219. Id. at 1360.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1360-61.
222. Id. at 1361.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1361.
225. Some types of secondary activity, particularly product boycotts, are not designed
to shut down the secondary employer, but to chip away at the primary employer's cus-
tomer base. Duplex and Bedford illustrate this type of situation: the union, intending the
picketing to discourage potential customers and to give the boycott 'teeth," orders its
members not to work on the product in question. See supra notes 91-96 and accompany-
ing text. These boycotts possess the potential to do great damage to the secondary em-
ployer who needs service on goods he already owns.
Contrast, however, the secondary boycott with the secondary picket. The ideal goal of
the picket line is to shut down the employer by discouraging employees from reporting to
work. See supra note 6.
226. See Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795 F.2d
1161, 1162 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No.
86-503); Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 797
(7th Cir.), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
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unaffected by the strike, or both, thus facilitating a railroad's continued
operation despite the strike.2"' Thus, the lack of recourse to secondary
picketing represents a greater threat to railroad laborers than to workers
in other industries.
Proponents of the non-literal interpretation assert that the public at
large needs to be protected from the fallout from secondary railway pick-
eting"" made possible by a literal application of the statutory lan-
guage. 2 9 Such fallout would include elimination of mail service,230
shortages of food,23' and, as in Ashley, loss of work to thousands em-
ployed by organizations dependent upon rail service for supplies and
shipping.2 32 Although Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Duplex, recog-
nized the possibility of overriding public policy concerns, 233 he neverthe-
less stated that Congress, by removing injunctive jurisdiction from the
federal courts, reserved for itself policy decisions as to the scope of per-
missible union activity. 234 Furthermore, the Railway Labor Act allows
for strikes,235 and a primary strike at a large railroad arguably is apt to
have destructive consequences similar to, if not greater than, those of a
secondary boycott. 36
The proponents of injunctive relief also express concern that literal
application of the broad statutory language could result in abusive resort
to secondary picketing. 237 The Burlington court effectively parried this
assertion by pointing out that unions must act with care when asking
227. See supra note 226.
228. Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1371 (8th
Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649,
659-60 (5th Cir.l (Clioate J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
229. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry., 625 F.2d at 1371 (8th Cir. 1980); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 362 F.2d at 659-60 (Choate, J., dissenting).
230. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d at 659-60 (Choate, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 659-60.
232. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry., 625 F.2d at 1371.
233. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also supra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
234. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 486-88 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
235. See supra notes 1, 17 and accompanying text.
236. Cf. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d
1228, 1235 (1st Cir. 1986) (if injunctions against secondary picketing issues on grounds of
interference with Interstate Commerce Act obligations, then injunctions must also issue
against primary activity for the same reason-an absurd result).
237. See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 795
F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir.) (Widener, J., dissenting) (attacking union's position that Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act allows secondary picketing of "any railroad in the United States
whether or not the picketed railway has any connection with the union or with the
strike"), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1986) (No. 86-503);
Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 806 (7th Cir.)
(rejecting notion that denying injunctions could encourage railroad unions to resort to
secondary picketing), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 657 (5th Cir.) (Choate, J., dissenting) (one
small railway strike could result in nation-wide railroad work stoppage), aff'd per curlain
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satisfied employees to walk off their jobs in support of another local's
strike.23 ' The threat to the continued well-being of the union caused by
frivolous institution of secondary pickets-characterized by poor public
image, congressional backlash, and rank and file dissatisfaction-would
tend to discourage abuse of this technique. 3 9
Last, Congress, through its sequence of Railway Labor Act, Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and National Labor Relations Act (including the Taft-
Hartley amendments) legislation, already has struck the balance between
labor interests and those of the neutral secondary employer on the one
hand, and the community at large on the other. To the extent that Con-
gress wished to control secondary activity, it did so through the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act that exempt
Railroad Labor Act cases2" and provide no private causes of action.2'
Secondary picketing represents a viable weapon for achieving parity, es-
pecially where, as in the interchange situation, circumstances make the
primary strike less effective than usual.
CONCLUSION
The plain language, legislative history, and subsequent judicial inter-
pretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act dictate that federal courts lack
jurisdiction to issue injunctions against secondary picketing in labor dis-
putes. Congress intended this broad prohibition to apply to all indus-
tries, including the railway industry. Neither the Railway Labor Act nor
the Interstate Commerce Act dictates a different result. Indeed, recourse
to secondary picketing by railroad laborers fulfills one of the Norris-La-
Guardia's stated purposes: to allow unions to battle effectively against
management.
Although application of the Act results in occassional unfairness and
inconvenience to the community, Congress balanced this harm against
the primary goal to be achieved by passage of this statute: parity in bar-
gaining power between labor and capital, and the resulting improvement
in labor's quality of life. That balance tipped in favor of an unqualified
prohibition against issuance of labor injunctions by the federal courts.
To the extent that Congress has outlawed secondary activity, it has done
by an equally divided Court sub noin. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
238. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795,
806 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
In Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 639 F. Supp.
220 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub norn., Central Vermont Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Empls., 793 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court found that denial of injunctive relief
would not result in abuse of secondary picketing in railway disputes. Although many
locals responded positively to the union's order to establish secondary picket lines at
other railroads, others did not. Id. at 227.
239. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Empls., 793 F.2d 795, 806
(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
240. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
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so through legislation that has no application to railway labor disputes,
and the courts are not free to find otherwise.
Catherine A. Vance
